Contents of Competition Law and Regulation of Technology Markets

Here’s the table of contents for the new book. Each chapter is mostly focused on EU law, but also has a US comparative section. 1. Introduction 2. Objectives of Competition Law and Regulation 3. Introduction to Competition Law 4. Competition Law and Pricing 5. Intellectual Property 6. Competition Law, Standards and Interoperability 7. Product Design and Innovation 8. Networks and Network Neutrality 9, Data, Data Protection and Competition Law Amazon links: UK US France...

Competition Law and Regulation of Technology Markets

The blogging hiatus has been caused partly by my return to the European Commission, and partly by the need to finish my new book, Competition Law and Regulation of Technology markets, published by Oxford University Press. The intended audience is practitioners, academics and in-house counsel with an interest in communications and high tech issues, in particular those that need to understand how these issues are handled in both the EU and the US. There are always unintended consequences of course, and I’m extremely pleased that the book has already been recommended on at least one LLM course in communications law. The book is mostly about antitrust in the communications sector, but also covers intellectual property, telecoms regulation and data protection. Its main focus is EU law, but includes substantial analysis of US law as well, highlighting similarities and differences. The book is now available, from all good (niche, specialised) bookstores, and also from the slightly less niche bookseller Amazon: UK US France Germany Happy...

Convergence and Divergence in International Antitrust

Christine Varney’s speeches as the Assistant Attorney General, such as that in Fordham last year, and yesterday’s speech in Paris (Co-ordinated Remedies: Convergence, Co-operation and the Role of Transparency) have struck a very constructive and conciliatory tone on the issue of convergence.  Convergence between antitrust authorities, and having a coherent global system is clearly important to her, and she rightly points out that consistency will benefit both agencies and businesses.  She also appreciates the limits to convergence, noting that any agency action has to be taken in the context of their own legal systems, and with a view to protect the consumers within that agency’s geographic area. In merger control, convergence works extremely well, particularly when parties time their notifications to the different agencies so that the agencies can move forward on a case together, discussing their thinking, and co-ordinating their information gathering.  There are still some disagreements, but complete convergence is almost certainly an unattainable goal – given a complex set of facts, reasonable people can disagree on the appropriate analysis. In recent years, more concern has been expressed about (the lack of) convergence in respect of unilateral conduct.  Given the DOJ’s section 2 report published last year, disavowed by several FTC Commissioners, then disavowed by Christine Varney, and withdrawn by the DOJ this year, transatlantic convergence is not the only problem to be addressed.  There are profound differences of view within the US legal system and legal community as to the appropriate section 2 liability standards. And these are divisions within one single legal system. When you look at reducing divisions across different legal systems, the problem...

The Competition Law of the European Union in Comparative Perspective

This seems to be my month for guest blogging.  Danny Sokol at the Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog asked if I would review Professor Eleanor Fox‘s comparative competition law book, The Competition Law of the European Union in Comparative Perspective, an excellent book that I gave some minor comments on in draft. My review is here on Danny’s...

Two Disciplines Divided By A Common Language

The IPKat weblog is a superb resource on a whole range of intellectual property issues, and it is well worth a regular read if  you are interested in anything to do with IP in Europe or the US.  I took issue at an aside made by the Kat on the subject of IP, monopoly and economists, and the Kat generously invited me to publish a guest post on the weblog. The problem I wanted to highlight is that antitrust law and intellectual property law both refer to “monopolies”, but that – contrary to what some IP lawyers and, to be fair, some caselaw from the early 20th century suggest – the term is used to mean two different things in the different legal disciplines.  My guest post  is...

Network Neutrality: “I wouldn’t start from here”

Erik Cecil’s recent post on net neutrality is generating discussion on several mailing lists. I agree with a lot of what Erik says – particularly summing up the underlying problem as “monopoly power in the loop plant”, a point which seems so obvious to my (European, antitrust-influenced) eyes, that I often stare with bemusement at some of the debates (and court judgments) in the US. But I wonder about the implied strategy of abandoning the net neutrality proposals in favour of some form of network access regulation. Calling for net neutrality to be abandoned because it does not address the most fundamental problem reminds me a little of the old joke about the tourist asking the local for directions and receiving the reply, “Well, I wouldn’t start from here.” Although the validity of the 1996 Telecom Act and its unbundling provisions has been upheld in principle, the various FCC attempts to implement unbundling in practice were struck down hard by the courts, seemingly giving little or no deference to FCC discretion.  Then with the shift in approach of the FCC under the Bush Administration, came the broadband de-regulation measures of 2003-2005 where first the cable networks, then the telecoms broadband networks were moved out of the scope of Title II of the 1996 Act and into Title I, ruling out any form of mandated third party access.  This was upheld in court, with a ruling that seemed to give the FCC significantly more margin for discretion in deregulating, than the FCC had been given in its earlier attempts at regulating: the most notable example, probably being the court agreeing...