by Kevin Coates | Apr 23, 2011 | Apple, Google
An interesting article that covers a lot of the issues about the latest iPhone (and now probably all smartphones) data protection controversy. The current debate raises several different issues: – is this legal under EU data protection rules? It looks as though several national DPOs are going to be looking at this; – do users who have agreed to the terms of service really know what it is they are agreeing to? Or is this a case of users accepting the default settings without really understanding – or perhaps caring? – possibly also the importance of network effects. It’s not clear so far if this location data is being kept by the operating system companies – Apple, Google, RIM etc – to improve their services, or is being passed on to network operators to help improve their networks. If the former, then we have another network effect – the more users a company has that uses your location services, then the more location feedback a company will receive, and the more it can improve the location services. Not a competition law problem, but potentially relevant to looking at questions of market power and barriers to entry. This article titled “iPhones and Android phones building vast databases for Google and Apple” was written by Charles Arthur, for The Guardian on Friday 22nd April 2011 16.20 UTC Apple and Google are using smartphones running their software to build gigantic databases for location-based services, according to new research following the Guardian’s revelations that iPhones and devices running Android collect location data about owners’ movements. iPhones and Android smartphones swap data – which...
by Kevin Coates | Oct 27, 2009 | Antitrust, Apple, Microsoft
Scoble has a great piece on why he thinks Apple’s iPhone isn’t going to be pushed aside anytime soon: 85,000 reasons why Apple’s iPhone isn’t going to be disrupted. The availability of large numbers of applications valued by users is one of the arguments that was used to support the finding that Microsoft had market power in the US and EU antitrust cases. In the US, the District Court’s findings of fact discusses the applications barrier to entry starting at para. 37: Consumer interest in a PC operating system derives primarily from the ability of that system to run applications. The consumer wants an operating system that runs not only types of applications that he knows he will want to use, but also those types in which he might develop an interest later. Also, the consumer knows that if he chooses an operating system with enough demand to support multiple applications in each product category, he will be less likely to find himself straitened later by having to use an application whose features disappoint him. Finally, the average user knows that, generally speaking, applications improve through successive versions. He thus wants an operating system for which successive generations of his favorite applications will be released — promptly at that. The fact that a vastly larger number of applications are written for Windows than for other PC operating systems attracts consumers to Windows, because it reassures them that their interests will be met as long as they use Microsoft’s product. For the EU, see the confirmation in the CFI’s Microsoft judgment of September 2007 (at para. 1088) upholding the Commission 2004 Microsoft...